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Abstract
In this paper we describe optimal trade-offs between time and space complexity of Merkle tree traversals with their associated
authentication paths, improving on the previous results of M. Jakobsson, T. Leighton, S. Micali, and M. Szydlo [Fractal Merkle tree
representation and traversal, in: RSA Cryptographers Track, RSA Security Conference, 2003] and M. Szydlo [Merkle tree traversal
in log space and time, in: Proc. Eurocrypt, in: LNCS, vol. 3027, 2004, pp. 541–554; Merkle tree traversal in log space and time,
Preprint version 2003, available at http://www.szydlo.com]. In particular, we show that our algorithm requires 2 log n/ log(3) n hash
function computations and storage for less than (log n/ log(3) n+1) log log n+2 log n hash values, where n is the number of leaves
in the Merkle tree. We also prove that these trade-offs are optimal, i.e. there is no algorithm that requires less than O(log n/ log t)
time and less than O(t log n/ log t) space for any choice of parameter t ≥ 2.
Our algorithm could be of special interest in the case when both time and space are limited.
c© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Merkle trees have found wide applications in cryptography mainly due to their conceptual simplicity and
applicability. Merkle trees were first described by Merkle [8] in 1979 and studied intensively. In cryptographic
applications, however, Merkle trees were not very useful for small computational devices, as the best known
techniques for traversal required a relatively large amount of computation and storage. Several recent papers, e.g.,
[5,15], improved the time and space complexity of Merkle trees. In this paper we address the issue of possible further
improvements of Merkle tree traversals.
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The Merkle tree is a complete binary tree such that values of internal nodes are one-way functions of the values
of their children. Every leaf value in a Merkle tree can be identified with respect to a publicly known root and the
authentication path of that leaf. An authentication path of a leaf consists of the siblings of all nodes on the path from
this leaf to the root.
Merkle trees have many cryptographic applications, such as certification refreshal [10], broadcast authentication
protocols [13], third-party data publishing [3], zero-knowledge sets [11] and micropayments [14]. A frequent
problem faced in such applications is the Merkle tree traversal problem, the problem of consecutively outputting
the authentication path for every leaf. In [9] Merkle proposed a technique for traversal of Merkle trees which
requires O(log2 n) space and O(log n) time per authentication path in the worst case. Here and further n denotes
the number of leaves in a Merkle tree. Recently, two results improving a technique of Merkle have appeared. In [5]
the authors describe a Merkle tree traversal algorithm with 2 log n/h hash computations per output, which uses less
than 2 log n(2h/h) + (log2 n/2h) space. In particular, they describe a Merkle tree traversal algorithm with less than
(3/2)(log2 n/ log log n) space and 2 log n/ log log n hash computations per output. In [15] Szydlo describes a method
requiring 3 log n space and log n hash computations and provides a proof that this bound is asymptotically optimal,
i.e. he proves that any algorithm that uses O(log n) memory locations works in Ω(log n) time per output. Observe
that we measure the time complexity of outputting the authentication path of a single leaf.
In this paper we investigate further the trade-off between time and space requirements of Merkle tree traversals.
First, we present an algorithm that works with 2 log n/h hash computations and (log n/h)2h + 2 log n memory
locations per output for an arbitrary parameter h ≥ 1. If h = Ω(log log n) and h = O(log n), this is a constant
improvement over [5]. For h = o(log log n), our result is an asymptotic improvement over the result of Jakobsson,
Leighton, Micali, and Szydlo [5]. If h = O(1), our result can be improved to work in log n hash computations per
round and 3 log n memory locations, which is equivalent to the result of Szydlo [16].
Secondly, in the previous papers only the number of hash computations per output was counted. In this paper, we
also analyze the total number of operations and show that Merkle tree traversal can be implemented with O(log n/h)
operations per output and O(log n(2h/h)) space.
Finally, we show that if a tree traversal algorithm needs at most α log n/h hash computations per output, then it
uses at least β(log n/h)2h words of memory, where α and β are constants independent of n and h. Thus we show that
our trade-off is optimal (up to a constant). See Section 5 for a complete description of this result.
The results presented give a complete answer to the question of time and space complexity of the Merkle tree
traversal problem. These results are also important for practical applications.
The main idea of our algorithm is described in Section 3.We give a detailed description of the algorithm in Section 4
and analyze its correctness in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2 we analyze the total number of operations per output in our
algorithm. The lower bound is proven in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries and notation
Below we denote as hash any one-way function, and “hash computation” will denote a computation of the value
of a one-way function. In a Merkle tree, leaf values are hash values of leaf pre-images. Leaf pre-images can be, for
instance, generated with a pseudo-random generator. We will denote as leaf-calc a function that computes pre-images
of the leaves, so that leaf-calc(i) computes the pre-image of the i-th leaf, and leaves are counted starting with leftmost
leaf. Let φ1(i)= hash◦leaf-calc(vi ) be the function that computes the value of the i-th leaf. Let φ2(parent)= hash(left
child||right child) be the function that computes the value of the parent node from the values of its children. We will
presume that we need one computation unit to compute φ1 or φ2. That is, the value of the i-th leaf is computed by
applying a one-way function to a leaf pre-image, and the value of an internal node is computed by applying a one-way
function to the concatenation of values stored in its left and right children. The value of the root of a Merkle tree is
public, but the values of all other nodes and leaf pre-images are known only to the tree owner.
In order to verify a pre-image of the i-th leaf, we compute a potential value of the root. We start by computing
the value of the i-th leaf. Then, the following step is repeated until the root of the Merkle tree is computed: we
concatenate the value stored in the currently visited node with the value stored in its sibling (the value in the sibling is
always known, since the sibling node is a part of the authentication path of the i-th leaf), determine the value stored in
the parent node by computing the one-way function of the concatenation, and move up to the parent of the currently
visited node. Verification succeeds if and only if the computed root value is equal to the known root value.
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Fig. 1. Authentication path for the leaf with index 0 in a Merkle tree.
Eval (A,i)
if (A = 0)
return φ1(i);
else
minlev := A − 1
V := Eval(A − 1, 2i)
V := φ2(V,Eval(A − 1, 2i + 1))
minlev := A
return V
Fig. 2. Evaluation of the i-th node on level A.
In the Merkle tree traversal problem, we must generate n outputs, where n is the number of leaves. Every output
consists of the leaf pre-image and its authentication path. An authentication path of a leaf consists of the siblings of
all nodes on the path from the leaf to the root. An example of an authentication path is shown on Fig. 1. Outputs for
the leaves must be generated consecutively, left to right. This makes our task easier, because outputs for consecutive
leaves share many common node values.
In this paper the following notation will be used. H will denote the Merkle tree height; thus H = log n. We will
say that a node is on level A if its depth is H − A. The i-th node from the left on level A will be denoted by (A, i),
i = 0, 1, . . . , n/2A − 1. A job computing node (A, i), i = 0, . . . , n/2A − 1, will also be denoted by (A, i). We will
say that A is the job level and i is the index of the job. Sometimes we will identify a subtree of the Merkle tree by its
root node (A, i). We will use a subtree height h as a parameter in our algorithm and L will be equal to H/h. We say
that a node N is needed if it is a part of an authentication path.
Sometimes we estimate the asymptotic performance of methods presented using functions of two variables. In this
case the following extension of the “big Oh” notation is used: we say that a function g(x, h) belongs to O( f (x, h))
iff ∃n1 ∈ N ∃n2 ∈ N ∃c ∈ R+ ∀x > n1 ∀h > n2 g(x, h) ≤ c f (x, h).
3. Main idea
We describe here the main idea of our algorithm and key observations on which the algorithm is based.
The well-known evaluation algorithm shown in Fig. 2 is used to compute the value of the i-th node on level A and
is an important part of all Merkle tree traversal algorithms.
This basic version of algorithm Eval requires O(2A) computational units and A storage units. The last follows
from the fact that at most one node value V for every height i , i = 0, 1, . . . , A, has to be stored at every stage of the
algorithm. These stored values will be further called tail values. Variable minlev stores the value of the minimal level
and equals to the minimum level for which the tail value of a job is stored at the current stage of the algorithm.
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Fig. 3. Subtrees computed at a round of the algorithm.
Our algorithm uses procedure Eval to estimate the values of nodes that will be needed in the future authentication
paths. The set of computations for finding the value of node (A, i) using procedure Eval(A, i) will be further called a
job (A, i).
Our algorithm combines two important observations that were also used in the papers of Jakobsson, Leighton,
Micali and Szydlo [5], and Szydlo [15]. The first key observation on which our algorithm is based is that during the
computation of node (A, i) its children (A − 1, 2i), (A − 1, 2i + 1) as well as all other descendants are computed.
Therefore by storing intermediate results of evaluation some future computations can be saved. Actually, for every
computed node N on level ih all its descendants on levels ih − 1, . . . , ih − h (i.e. a complete subtree of height h
rooted in N ) will be retained to be used in the future authentication paths. Thus only nodes at height ih, i = 1, . . . , L ,
will be computed directly (see Fig. 3).
Another key observation is that we can schedule the computations of the nodes needed in the future in such a way
that at most H storage units are necessary to store all the tail values.
In Section 6 a further constant improvement is described. We show that in a subtree only nodes with odd indices
must be stored. We also show that the next subtree can be computed as the nodes of the current subtree are discarded
so that the total number of nodes used by subtrees on a level ih, i = 1, 2, . . . , L , is 2h .
4. Algorithm description
Our algorithm consists of three phases: root generation, output, and verification. During the first phase the root
of the Merkle tree is generated. Additionally, the initial set of subtrees with roots at (0, 2ih), i = 1, . . . , L , is computed
and stored. The verification phase is identical to the traditional verification phase (see, for instance, [5]). The output
phase consists of 2H rounds, and during round j an image of the j-th leaf and its authentication path are output. In
the rest of this section we will describe an algorithm for the output phase and prove its correctness.
For convenience we will measure time in rounds. During each round, 2L computation units are spent on
computation of subtrees needed in the future authentication paths. Thus our algorithm starts at time 0 and ends at
time 2H − 1, and the i-th round starts at time i . In the first part of the algorithm description we will ignore the costs
of all operations, except those of the computations of hash functions. Later we will show that the number of other
operations performed during a round is O(L).
During round j we store L many already computed subtrees with roots at (sh,ms) where j ∈ [ms2sh, (ms + 1)
2sh − 1], s = 0, 1, . . . , L . During the same round we also spend 2L computation units in order to compute jobs
(sh,ms + 1) and construct the corresponding subtrees. At round (ms + 1)2sh the subtree (sh,ms) will be discarded.
However the subtree (sh,ms + 1) will be retained for the next 2sh rounds, while subtree (sh,ms + 2) is computed.
During each round there are at most L different jobs competing for 2L computation units. These jobs will be called
active. Active jobs are scheduled according to the following rules:
(1) A job (ih, k), k = 1, . . . , H/2ih , becomes active at time (k − 1)2ih , i.e. during the (k − 1)2ih-th round.
(2) All active jobs (s′, ks′) with s′ > s such that the minimal level of (s′, ks′) is less than s have priority over the job
(s, ks) on level s.
(3) In all other cases jobs with the lower level have priority over jobs with the higher level.
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Consider job (sh, i) that becomes active at time 2sh(i − 1). Rule 2 guarantees that all jobs with levels s′h such that
s′ > s do not store any tail values on levels 1, 2, . . . , sh − 1 when the computation of job (sh, i) starts. Therefore,
when job (sh, i) is computed, only one tail node on each of the levels (s − 1)h, (s − 1)h + 1, . . . , sh − 1 will be
stored. Now consider a job (s′′h, is′′) on level s′′h, s′′ = 1, . . . , s − 1. If job (sh, i) stores a tail node on level s˜ < s′′,
then (s′′h, is′′) is either already completed (rule 3), or has not started yet (rule 2).
This scheduling guarantees us that at any time only one tail value for a level i = 1, 2, . . . , H will be stored by
all jobs (sh, i). Only 2L subtrees (one currently used and one currently computed for each level ih) must be stored
at each round, and all subtrees require (2H/h)(2h+1 − 1) space. Hence the memory requirement of our algorithm is
O((2H/h)2h)+ O(H) = O((H/h)2h).
These considerations allow us to formulate the following trade-off between time and space complexity.
Theorem 1. A Merkle tree can be traversed with 2H/h hash computations and 4((H/h)2h) + H storage units for
any h ≥ 1.
Corollary 1. AMerkle tree can be traversed with 2(log n/ log(3) n) hash computations and 4(log n log log n/ log(3) n)
+ log n storage units.
In the following subsections we will prove the algorithm correctness by showing that all values are computed on
time and estimate the total number of operations by analysis of the job scheduling.
4.1. Correctness proof
In this section we show that job (sh, k) will be completed at time k2sh .
Lemma 1. Suppose that at time (k − 1)2sh for every level i = h, 2h, . . . , (s − 1)h, (s + 1)h, . . . Lh there is at most
one unfinished job on level i . Then job (sh, k) will be completed before the k2sh-th round.
Proof. Consider the time interval [(k − 1)2sh, k2sh − 1]. There is at most one job (s′′h, ks′′) with s′′ > s, such
that the minimal level of (s′′h, ks′′) is smaller than s. After less than 2sh+1 hash computations the minimal level
of (s′′h, ks′′) will be at least sh. Besides that, there are also jobs with lower indices that must be completed before
(sh, k) can be completed. There are at most 2(s−s′)h such jobs for every s′ < s. All jobs on level s′h require less than
2(s−s′)h2s′h+1 = 2sh+1 computation units for every s′ < s. Hence, the total number of computation units needed for
these jobs is (s − 1)2sh+1. Thus we have 2sh+1 computation units left to complete the job (sh, k). 
Lemma 2. At every moment of time there is only one running job on level sh, s = 1, 2, . . . , L.
Proof. At time 0 we start only one job on level sh. For every level sh and every index i , we can prove by induction
using Lemma 1 that at time interval [2shi, 2sh(i + 1)) there is only one running job with index i on level sh. 
Lemma 3. The computation of job (sh, i) will be finished before time i2sh .
Proof. Easily follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.
In our computation only every h-th node on the computation path is computed directly. Below we will show which
nodes should be retained during the computation of (sh, i).
All nodes (ih − m, s2m + j), where m = 1, . . . , h and j = 0, . . . ,m − 1, must be retained. In other words, all
descendants of (ih, s) at levels ih − 1, . . . , (i − 1)h must be retained. 
Proposition 1. Descendants of a node (ih,m) are needed during rounds [m2ih, (m + 1)2ih).
Proof. Indeed, children of (ih,m) are needed during rounds [m2ih + 2ih−1, (m + 1)2ih) and [m2ih,m2ih + 2ih−1).
For descendants on other levels this proposition is proved by the fact that when a node is needed, the sibling of its
parent is also needed.
Combining Lemma 3 with Proposition 1, we see that every node will be computed before it is needed for the first
time. 
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4.2. Time analysis
We have shown above that our algorithm performs 2L hash function computations per round. Now we will show
that all other operations will take O(L) time per round.
Lemma 4. Job scheduling, according to rules 1.–3. can be implemented in O(L) time per round.
For every level s = ih, we store a list Qi of level s jobs that have to be performed. When a new job on level ih
becomes active or when the minimal level of some job becomes smaller than ih, this job is added to Qi . Lists Qi are
implemented as queues (FIFO lists).
At round j our algorithm checks all queues Qi in ascending order. If a non-empty Qi is found, we spend 2L hash
computations on computing the last job l in Qi . If the job l is finished after k < 2L hash computations, or if the
minimal level of l becomes higher than (i+1)h−1, we remove l from Qi and traverse queues Qi , Qi+1, . . . QL until
another non-empty queue is found.
Procedure Eval can require up to H − 1 recursive calls in the worst case. However, an equivalent non-recursive
implementation is possible (see procedure EvalBottom in the Appendix).
5. Lower bound
In this section we prove the lower bound on space and time complexity of Merkle tree traversals and show that the
algorithm described above is asymptotically optimal. We prove the following result:
Theorem 2. There exist constants α and β that do not depend on n and h, such that:
– For an arbitrary h > 1, any Merkle tree traversal algorithm whose average time per round does not exceed
α log n/h requires at least β(log n(2h/h)) memory locations.
– For an arbitrary h > 1, any Merkle tree traversal algorithm that uses no more than β(log n(2h/h)) memory
locations performs at least α log n/h hash computations per round.
We count computation units and memory units used during all rounds of a Merkle tree traversal. We need one
computation unit for one hash computation. We need one memory unit to store one hash value during one round. We
say that a node N is a j-ancestor of a node (A, i) on level A if N is an ancestor of (A, i) and N is on the level A+ j .
Recall that a node (A, i) is needed during a round j if it is a part of an authentication path for the j-th leaf.
We say that a node (A, i) is retained if we store the value of (A, i) after some ancestor of (A, i) is computed. Each
node in a Merkle tree must be either computed or retained. For instance, in the algorithm described in Sections 3 and 4
of this paper, all nodes on levels ih, i = 1, 2, . . . , log n/h, are computed, and all other nodes are retained. We say that
a node (A, i) is t-retained for some t ∈ N if (A, i) is stored after its t-ancestor is computed. A node N is t+-retained
(t−-retained) if N is q-retained for some q ≥ t (q < t). To compute a node (A, i), 2A+1 − 1 ≥ 2A computation units
are required.
We say that a node (A, i) is even (odd) if its index is even (odd). An even (odd) node is a left (right) child of its
parent. In our lower bound reasoning we consider simplified Merkle tree traversal algorithms that compute only odd
nodes in a Merkle tree. During the j-th round, a simplifiedMerkle tree traversal algorithm outputs the odd nodes that
belong to the authentication path of the j-th leaf. Obviously, any lower bound for the simplified Merkle tree traversal
problem is also valid for the Merkle tree traversal. We will prove that for any h > 1 any simplifiedMerkle tree traversal
algorithm that uses no more than (1/8)n log n/h computation units requires at least (1/8)n log n(2h/h)memory units.
We will also prove that any simplified Merkle tree traversal algorithm that uses no more than (1/8)n log n(2h/h)
memory units requires at least (1/8)n log n(2h/h) computation units. Essentially, we divide all odd nodes in a Merkle
tree into groups and show that each group requires either many computation units or many memory units.
We will use the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that a node (A, i) is t+-retained during a computation of some odd node (A+ p, j) for some
p ≥ t , so that j = i/2p is odd. Then the value of (A, i) is stored during at least 2A+t rounds.
Proof. Since the node (A + p, j) is an odd node, it is needed during 2A+p rounds [( j − 1)2A+p, j2A+p − 1]. Since
(A, i) is a descendant of the node (A + p, j), (A, i) is needed during some rounds in the interval [ j2A+p, ( j +
1)2A+p − 1] according to Proposition 1. Hence, (A, i) is stored during 2A+p ≥ 2A+t rounds before it is needed. 
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Fig. 4. Example of a subtree. Computed nodes are marked by circles. Nodes marked by circles or squares are stored.
Consider an arbitrary simplified Merkle tree traversal algorithm and let h > 1 be an arbitrary parameter. We
divide all odd nodes in a Merkle tree into groups, so that the i-th group Gi consists of all odd nodes on levels
ih, ih + 1, . . . , (i + 1)h − 1, i = 0, . . . , log n/h − 1. Let Ki be the set of all odd nodes on level ih. The total number
of nodes in Ki is n/2ih+1. To compute a node on level ih + q, we need 2ih+q+1 − 1 ≥ 2ih+q computation units.
We divide all groups into two sets, R and S. R consists of groups Gi1 ,Gi2 , . . .Gir ; a group Gi j belongs to R if
at most half of the nodes in Ki j are h
+-retained. S consists of groups G j1 ,G j2 , . . . ,G js ; a group G ji belongs to S
if more than half of the nodes in K ji are h
+-retained. Consider an arbitrary group Gi j ∈ R; Gi j contains at least
n/2i jh+2 nodes that are h−-retained or computed directly. Let pq be the number of q-retained nodes in Ki j for some
q < h. Then there are at least pq/2q computed nodes on level i jh+q, and the total number of computation units spent
on the nodes on level i jh+q is at least pq2i jh . If p0 is the number of computed nodes in Ki j , then all computed nodes
in Ki j require p02
i jh computation units. Summing up by all pq we see that the total number of computation units spent
on the nodes of Gi j is at least
∑h−1
q=0 pq2i jh . Since
∑h−1
q=0 pq ≥ n/2i jh+2,
∑h−1
q=0 pq2i jh ≥ n/4. If r ≥ (log n/2h),
then the algorithm uses at least (1/8)n log n/h computation units.
Now consider an arbitrary group G ji ∈ S. Every h+-retained node in K ji needs at least 2h · 2 ji memory units. The
number of h+-retained nodes in G ji is at least n/(4 · 2 ji ). Hence all nodes in G ji need at least n2h/4 memory units.
If the number of groups in S, s ≥ (log n/2h), then the algorithm uses at least n log n(2h/h)/8 memory units.
Since r + s = log n/h, [r ≤ log n/2h] ⇒ [s ≥ log n/2h] and [s ≤ log n/2h] ⇒ [r ≥ log n/2h]. Hence, any
algorithm that performs no more than (1/8)n log n/h hash computations uses at least (1/8)n log n(2h/h) memory
units, and any algorithm that uses no more than (1/8)n log n(2h/h) memory units performs at least (1/8)n log n/h
hash computations.
The statement of the theorem follows immediately.
6. A constant improvement
In this section we describe an improved version of the algorithm from Section 4. In our improved version we do
not compute all nodes in the subtrees. Instead of this, only the nodes with odd indices are computed. This is possible
because even nodes will be needed after their children are needed. Therefore, if we store both children of an even
node until their parent is needed, we can compute the value of that even node with one hash computation. This idea is
similar to the constant improvement of Szydlo [16]. Later in this section we will show that the number of stored nodes
can be further improved by a careful scheduling that allows us to compute the nodes of the next subtree on level i just
as the nodes of the currently used subtree are discarded.
Thus, in a subtree (ih, k) we only compute nodes (ih− 1, 2k + 1), (ih− 2, 4k + 1), (ih− 3, 8k + 1), . . . and only
the nodes (ih− 1, 2k+ 1), (ih− 2, 4k+ 1), (ih− 2, 4k+ 3), . . . , (ih− h, k2h + 1), . . . , (ih− h, k2h + 2h − 1)must
be stored (see an example on Fig. 4).
Computation of all odd descendants of (ih, k) will take time 2ih−1+1 − 1 + 2ih−2+1 − 1 + · · · + 2ih−h+1 − 1 =∑h−1
k=0 2ih−k − h = 2ih+1 − 2(i−1)h+1 − h. We will need h extra hash computations to compute the even nodes.
Therefore the total number of computations for subtree (ih, k) is 2ih+1 − 2(i−1)h+1.
It is easy to see that there is at most one “new” even node at every round. Therefore it takes at most one extra
computation per round to deal with even nodes (if we compute even nodes just as they are needed).
To compute the node (s, j) with one hash computation we have to store its odd child (s− 1, 2 j + 1) during rounds
[(2 j + 1)2s−1, (2 j + 2)2s−1). Thus there are at most h odd nodes that should be kept “extra time” and at most h
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other nodes that are a part of an authentication path during each round. Therefore the total memory requirement is
(2h − 1+ 2h)L per subtree. We need the first summand to store the odd nodes in the subtree and we need the second
summand to store the even nodes from the current authentication path and odd nodes kept “extra time”.
The nature of our trade-off depends on the subtree height h. For subtree height h = 1, this improvement results in
a speed-up of almost factor 2. This allows us to formulate the following result.
Corollary 2. A Merkle tree traversal algorithm can be implemented with log n hash function evaluations, 3 log n
memory locations for hash values and O(log n) time for other operations per round.
Corollary 2 is identical to the result of [16] with respect to hash computations, but we also provide an upper bound
for the total number of used operations.
For larger values of h the time improvement becomes very small but we have an almost twofold decrease of the
space used by hash values. In the last case we can also schedule our computation in such a way that the values
in the next subtree are computed almost exactly at the time when the corresponding values in the current subtree
“expire” and can be discarded. In this case at most one extra value per subtree would have to be stored. In our
modified procedure computation of odd nodes of subtree (ih, k), i = 2, 3, . . . , L − 1, is divided into two stages.
In the first stage, descendants of (ih, k) on level (i − 1)h (“leaves” of the subtree) are computed. We will further
call nodes ((i − 1)h, 2hk + j), j ∈ [0, 2h − 1], bottom level nodes of subtree (ih, k). In the second stage, the odd
nodes are computed from bottom level nodes. Computation of the subtree (ih, k) takes place in the same time interval
[2ih(k − 1), 2ihk − 1] as in our first algorithm. The idea of our modification is that nodes ((i − 1)h, 2hk + j),
j ∈ [0, 2h − 1], i.e. bottom level nodes of (ih, k), are computed more slowly than odd nodes of subtree (ih, k − 1)
are discarded. Computation of the odd nodes from the bottom tree nodes is performed during the last 2h rounds of the
interval [2ih(k− 1), 2ihk− 1]. We will further call the jobs computing the bottom level nodes secondary jobs, and the
last job computing the remaining odd nodes of the subtree will be called a primary job. In order to reserve 2h rounds
for the primary job, we allocate 2(i−1)h − 1 rounds for computation of every secondary job. Thus the m-th secondary
job for subtree (ih, k) starts at time (k − 1)2ih +m2(i−1)h −m. The secondary jobs obey the scheduling rules (2) and
(3) specified in Section 4. A pseudocode description of the modified procedure Eval is given in the Appendix.
Now we prove the space bound of our modified algorithm. First we show that a secondary job of a node on level
ih can be completed in 2(i−1)h − 1 rounds.
Lemma 5. Suppose that at time (k− 1)2ih +m2(i−1)h −m, m = 0, 1, . . . , 2h − 1, for every level l = h, 2h, . . . , (i −
1)h, (i + 1)h, . . . Lh there is at most one unfinished secondary job of a job on level l. Then the m-th secondary job of
(ih, k) will complete before (k − 1)2ih + (m + 1)2(i−1)h − m − 1.
Proof. Consider the time interval [(k − 1)2ih + m2(i−1)h − m, (k − 1)2ih + (m + 1)2(i−1)h − m − 1).
There is at most one job (i ′′h, ki ′′) with i ′′ > i , such that the minimal level of (i ′′h, ki ′′) is smaller than i . After
at most 2ih+1 − 2 hash computations minimal level of (i ′′h, ki ′′) will be at least ih. Besides that, there are also jobs
on lower levels that must complete before (sh, k) can be completed. There are at most 2(i−i ′)h such jobs for every
index 1 < i ′ < i . Thus for any fixed i ′ < i all jobs on level i ′ require 2(i−i ′)h(2i ′h+1 − 1) < 2ih+1 − 2 job units.
Another (2h+1− 1)2(i−1)h < 2ih+1− 2 computation units are claimed by subtrees on level h. Hence the total number
of computation units required by all other jobs is strictly less than (L − 1)(2ih+1 − 2).
Thus we have at least 2ih+1 − 1 computation units left to complete the m-th secondary job of (ih, k). 
Lemma 6. Computation of the m-th secondary job of (ih, k), i = 2, 3, . . . , L − 1, will be finished before time
(k − 1)2ih + (m + 1)2(i−1)h − m − 1.
The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.
It easily follows from Lemma 6 and the above discussion that the computation of the m-th bottom node of subtree
(sh, k) will be finished in interval [2ih(k − 1)+ m2(i−1)h − m, 2ih(k − 1)+ (m + 1)2(i−1)h − m − 1]. It remains to
compute how many odd nodes of (ih, k − 1) are discarded before round 2ih(k − 1)+ m2(i−1)h − m.
Let w = 2h . After 2h(i−1)m rounds the number of remaining nodes can be estimated as (w−m)/2+ (w−m)/4+
· · ·+(w−m)/w ≤ (w−m). We did not count the nodes of the current authentication path in this estimation. Therefore
the total number of stored nodes in subtrees (ih, k) and (ih, k − 1) in interval [2ih(k − 1), 2ihk − 2h − 1] is limited
by 2h .
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Eval1 (A,k)
i := A/h
if ( round = 2ih(k − 1)+ 2(i−1)hm − m)
bottom[m] := EvalBottom(2(i−1)h,m + (k − 1)2h)
EvalTop(A, k)
Fig. 5. Procedure Eval1.
The primary job for (sh, k) can be computed in 2h rounds. This job can be performed in place, because when a
new node is computed its even child can be discarded.
In the modified algorithm we apply the job scheduling scheme only to subtrees on levels ih, i = 2, . . . , L − 1.
Since there is only one subtree for i = L , it is not recomputed. Therefore the total number of tail nodes does not
exceed H − h.
During each round we use two reserved computation units to compute the next level h subtree. By the same
argument as above, we can see that the number of remaining nodes in the current level h subtree after m rounds is
limited by 2h − m. Therefore the total number of nodes in the current and future subtrees of level h is limited by 2h .
This computation would require up to h additional units for the tail values. Therefore the total number of tail values
is H − h + h = H .
The above considerations allow us to formulate the following
Theorem 3. A Merkle tree traversal can be implemented in O(L) time with 2L hash operations. This algorithm
requires L2h + 2H memory locations to store hash values and O(L2h) memory locations to store the auxiliary
variables.
In the last theorem we have ignored time necessary to output the log n values per round. The result described in the
abstract follows if we choose h = log(3) n.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we describe the first optimal trade-off between time and space complexity of Merkle tree traversals.
We believe it is possible to improve further the constants in the described trade-off by differentiating between nodes
of various types in our procedure.
Another interesting problem was described in [15]: given space to store only S hash nodes, what is the minimal
number of hash computations per round? [15] proposes it in a combination with [5] as a starting point of this
investigation.
Yet another interesting problem is the complexity of the traversal of the so-called skew (unbalanced) Merkle trees
[6].
For further reading
[1], [2], [4], [7], [12]
Appendix
In this Appendix we give a pseudocode description of the modified procedure Eval(A,k), A = ih (Fig. 5). Recall
that first all descendants of (A, k) on level (i −1)h are computed and the computation of the m-th descendant starts at
time 2ih(k − 1)+ 2(i−1)hm − m. Procedure EvalBottom is algorithmically identical to procedure Eval in Section 3.
That is, the same sequence of hash computations is performed. Therefore all proofs in Section 4 remain valid if we use
EvalBottom or Eval1 instead of Eval. However the implementation presented here does not use recursion. Variables
Taillev are global, i.e. common to all procedures EvalBottom.
Procedure EvalTop(A, k) computes all odd nodes of the height h subtree rooted in (A, k) if all descendants of
(A, k) on level (i − 1)h are known. The pseudocode is very similar to EvalBottom but EvalTop(A, k) works in place,
i.e. with only a constant number of additional variables (Figs. 6 and 7).
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EvalBottom (A,k)
ind := 2Ak
minlev := lev := 0
while (lev < A)
V := φ1(ind)
while (ind mod 2 = 1)
V := φ2(Taillev, V )
lev := lev+ 1
minlev := minlev+ 1
ind := ind/2
Taillev := V
ind := (ind + 1)2lev
minlev := lev := 0
Fig. 6. Procedure EvalBottom.
EvalTop (A,k)
ind := 2Ak
minlev := lev := 0
while (lev < A)
V := bottom[ind]
while (ind mod 2 = 1)
leftind := 2levind
rightind := 2lev(ind + 1)
bottom[leftind] := φ2(bottom[leftind], bottom[rightind])
lev := lev+ 1
minlev := minlev+ 1
ind := ind/2
ind := (ind + 1)2lev
minlev := lev := 0
Fig. 7. Procedure EvalTop.
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